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COMMENTS
the mistake was inexcusable.54 The fact that the trial court overlooked the
error did not release the attorney from responsibility to his client.
Not only is the attorney liable for his own lack of skill and negligence
but, under the general rules of partnership and agency, he is liable also for
that of his partners5" and of his clerks.5 If a member of a firm of attorneys
is acting within the scope of his employment, the partners are jointly and
severally liable for his acts-" with or without their knowledge of participa-
tions 8 It is obvious, therefore, that the attorney should use extraordinary
care in selecting his partners and clerks.
The standards set by the legal profession are high. It is apparent from
this discussion that the courts will not hesitate to hold the attorney liable
for failure to maintain these standards. While preparing this paper the
problems herein were discussed with several young attorneys and law stu-
dents. The general consensus of opinion was to the effect that the problem
would be adequately solved by insurance coverage. True, this would protect
both the client and the attorney from financial loss, and, by all means, the
client's interest should be so protected. But the immediate financial loss is
not the only problem involved. No insurance can pay for the public humili-
ation suffered by the attorney nor repair his ruined ieputation. It cannot
replace the loss of dignity to the profession as a whole caused by the negli-
gence of a few of its members. While the field of preventative law has not
progressed as far as the field of preventative medicine, the interests of the
client, the attorney and the profession would be greatly advanced if the
individual attorney would practice preventative law on himself.
NiciioLAs A. CRANE
FACTORS AFFECTING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
I NTRODUCH[ON
The doctrine of punitive damages is so well settled that a dissertation
on its raisort d'etre would be of little value. Briefly, however, exemplary or
punitive damages are generally awarded when the wrong has been corn-
mitted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, outrageous
aggravation or with reckless indifference for the rights of others.' Punitive
damages have been awarded in contract actions, but such awards are rela-
tivelv rare. Generally, punitive damages are not recoverable in a breach of
54. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 Pac. 97l" (1929).
55. CRANE ON PARTNERSHIPS § 54 (2d ed. 1952); 3 SIIEANIUAN AND REDNIFiFLD ON
NEGLICENCE § 586 (Rev. ed. 1941).
56. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Col. App. 677, 28 Pac. 871 (1929).
57. Rouse v. Pollard, 130 N.J. Eq. 204, 21 A.2d 801 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941); Riley
v. Larocque, 163 Misc. 423, 297 N.Y. Supp. 756 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
58. Priddy v. MacKenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S.W. 968 (1907); Model Building and
Loan Ass'n v. Reeves, 201 App. Div. 329, 194 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Ist Dep't 1922). But
cf. Wildermann v. Wachtell, 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y. Supp. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
1. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578. 12 So.2d 465 (1943).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
contract action unless the act or omission constituting the breach also
amounts to a tort.2  Theoretically, punitive damages are awarded in tort
over and above the actual or compensatory damages.3
JUSTIFICATION
The theories upon which the doctrine of punitive damages has been
sustained are varied and conflicting. The majority view is well expressed in
a leading Florida case, Smith v. Bagwell, wherein it was said that "exem-
plary damages are such as blend together the interests of society and of the
aggrieved individual," and not only recompense plaintiff but also punish
and deter the offender and act as an example and warning to the commu-
nity.4 An Alabama case5 qualifies this somewhat in opining that punitive
damages act as punishment and as a restraint on the transgressor for the
benefit of society rather than as a deterrent to the actual offender.
Other jurisdictions hold that punitive damages are not punitive at all,6
but rather are compensatory in nature; and that they are given for non-
pecuniary losses such as injured feelings, damaged reputations, humilia-
tion and shame. Damages are increased because the injury is aggravated
by the added humiliation. Acts of indignity to an individual which damage
his reputation give an added "smart" to the injury,' and for this reason
punitive damages are sometimes referred to as "smart money".
In a landmark case, Fay v. Parker,8 it was held that punitive damages
were actually given for mental anguish and pain, not because of the ques-
tionable punitive deterrent but rather because mental suffering was not in-
cluded in computing compensatory damages.
Still other jurisdictions allow punitive damages only insofar as it bene-
fits the public interest and not for the purpose of enriching the injured
party? In a novel case punitive damages were given as a reward for public
service in bringing the wrongdoer to justice.' 0
Some states do not favor punitive damages except where allowed by
statute" - alienation of spouse's affection being one of the grounds enume-
rated. 12 Others do not recognize punitive damages in any sense. Following
the Code Law of France, Louisiana does not allow infliction of vindictive,
punitive or exemplary damages in civil cases.' Massachusetts,14 Nebras-
2. Hood v. Moffet, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915).
3. Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
4. Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 45 Am. Rep. 12, 14 (1882).
5. Bowles v. Lowery, 51 Ala. App. 555, 59 So. 696 (1912).
6. Elliott v. V2an Buren, 33 Mich. 49, 20 Am. Rep. 668 (1875).
7. Haveland v. Chase, 116 Mich. 214, 72 Am. St. Rep. 519 (1898).
8. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.M. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1872).
9, Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Hardie, 100 Miss. 132, 55 So. 967 (1911).
10. Neal v. Newberger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929).
H1. Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888).
12. Moellur v. Moellur, 55 Mont. 30, 173 Pac. 419 (1918).
13. Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So.Zd 599 (1949); Gugert v. New Orleans
Independent Laundries, 181 So. 653 (La. App. 1938); Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana &
T. R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917).
14. Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265
(1943).
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ka15 and Washington'6 subscribe to the Louisiana view, declaring that there is
no justification for punitive damages and they are, therefore, unsound in
principle and dangerous in practice. Why exact a vindictive pound of flesh
when compensatory damages make plaintiff whole?"
The Federal courts follow the majority view in assessing punitive dam-
ages;"8 but under the Federal Tort Claims Act,"' although the United States
is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as an individual, this
waiver of immunity does not extend to and include punitive damages.' 0
The courts have difficulty in labeling that type of act for which puni-
tive damages are assessable. Abstractions such as wantonness, malice and
gross negligence have frequently been used.21 An Alabama case said, "To
authorize punitive damages there must be gross negligence, an entire want
of care," 22 while an earlier case said the act need not be wanton as long as it
aggravates the plaintiff.2 3
An early Florida case held that gross negligence not amounting to
wanton indifference will not warrant exemplary damages. However, a later
case seemed to dispense with the necessity of a label and held that the
character or type of negligencee needed to sustain a verdict of punitive dam-
ages is that negligence which is sufficiently culpable under the circumstances
to permit such an award. 2  To those who accept punitive damages that, at
least, seems to be a step forward (albeit in the wrong direction) .25 Another
Florida case held that malice was a necessary ingredient in a tort committed
under a mistaken supposed right before punitive damages could be
awarded.20 Query: Can you be mistakenly malicious since the terms are
diametrically opposed?
Punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are not given as a
matter of right," but only in the discretion of the jury.28 Such discretion
must be reasonably used and not abused. 29
RELATION BETWEEN COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The courts are confusingly divergent as to what relation punitive dam-
15.Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 8 Am. St. Rep. 155 (1888).
16. Walker v. Gilman, 25 Wash.2d 557, 171 P.2d 797 (1946); Spokane Truck and
Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 107 (1891).
17. Ibid.
18. Washington Gaslight Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 (1898); Scalise v. National
Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946).
21. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So.2d 465 (1943).
22. Alabama Power Co. v. Dunlap, 240 Ala. 568, 200 So. 617 (1941).
23. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, 76 So. 515 (1917).
24. Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939).
25. See criticism in conclusion.
26. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936).
27. Florida East Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
28. Waterworks Co. v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838 (1911).
29. Cox v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 163 Ala. 170, 50 So. 975(1909;
Coleman v. Pepper, 159 Ala. 310, 49 So. 310 (1909); McDonald v. Stone, 114 Ala. 60
154 So. 327 (1934).
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ages must bear to actual or compensatory damages. Is it proper to award
punitive damages where only nominal damages have been won? It has been
held that nominal damages are enough to support punitive damages, as long
as there has been an invasion of one's right. s0 The right invaded, however,
seems to have been refined somewhat. Opprobrious language, such as "go
to hell", spoken over the telephone was not enough of an invasion of one's
right to support punitive damages although nominal damages were
awarded.8 1
Other courts have held that punitive damages will not be allowed if no
actual damages are shown. 3 The Florida Supreme Court has so held;33 but
a federal court, in applying Florida law, has held otherwise. The court said
that in Florida, as in the federal courts, punitive damages need not bear any
relation to, nor be dependant upon, actual damages. 34  Subsequently, the
same court said punitive damages must bear some relation to actual dam-
ages.3 5
Other jurisdictions hold that punitive damages must be in some propor-
tion to compensatory damages,"" and a verdict of $557.50 actual damages,
plus $5,000.00 punitive damages, was considered excessive and out of propor-
tion.37 As yet, the courts have been unable to agree as to the proper
formula for determining this relationship.
MITIGATING FACTORS
Double Jeopardy
The Constitution of the United States and similar provisions in state
constitutions provide that "no person shall be put in jeopardy of life or
liberty twice for same offense. . . ."I" The majority of jurisdictions interpret
this section to mean two criminal prosecutions. Punitive damages are not
precluded merely because the defendant has been prosecuted criminally
for the same offense. 9 Punitive damages are given in a civil action for the
wrong committed against the individual specifically, while in a criminal
proceeding, the state punishes the defendant for the wrong committed
against society generally.
An early Florida case held that a verdict of punitive damages for a
wrong also punishable as a criminal offense does not subject the defendant
to double jeopardy and is, therefore, not unconstitutional. 4" Other courts
30. Goodson v. Stewart, 154 Ala. 660, 46 So. 230 (1908).
31. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Jennings, 10 Miss. 673, 70 So. 830 (1916).
32. Clark v. McClurg, 21; Cal. 270, 9 P.2d 505 (1931); Livingston v. Utah-Colo-
rado Land & Live Stock Co., 106 Colo. 278, 103 P.2d 684 (1940); McCain v. Cochran,
153 Miss. 237, 120 So. 823 (1929),
33. McClain v. Pensacola Coach Corp. 152 Fla. 876, 13 So.2d 221 (1943).
34. Scalise v. National Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941).
35. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948).
36. Cordon v. McLearn, 123 Ark. 496, 185 S.W. 803 (1916); Hunter v. Kansas
City Ry., 213 Mo. App. 233, 248 S.W. 998 (1923).
37. Bascom W. Pendleton v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 82 W.Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941
(1918)
3. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
39. Brown v. Evans, 109 U.S. 180 (1883).
40. Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 45 Am. Rep. 12 (1882).
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hold that where a defendant has been punished criminally it ought to at
least mitigate punitive damages.4 ' Connecticut limits the amount to the
actual expenses incurred in maintaining the action.4 2 Others, although con-
ceding that punitive damages do not subject an individual to double jeop-
ardy within the meaning of the judicial interpretation of double jeopardy,
reason that there is no logical, 48 just,44 or sufficient basis for allowing them,
as such damages are repugnant to every sense of justice. 5 After the defend-
ant has already been criminally punished, another trial, although civil in
nature, "is in substance putting the accused in jeopardy twice for the same
offense." 46 The State of Indiana proclaims it unconstitutional outright and
within the prohibition of the double jeopardy clause.4 7 Where a state pro-
vides a punishment through criminal prosecution no punitive damages will
be awarded, since one violation should logically result in only one pun-
ishment.48
Economic Status of Defendant
Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish, the financial condi-
tion of the defendant should be considered to determine what would be a
proper punishment for his wrongful act.49 Punitive damages of $1,000.00
assessed against a millionaire would hardly be considered punishment,
whereas a like amount assessed against another might be intolerable. 0
Inconsistently, the courts have not taken the converse into consideration.
The fact that a defendant may not have any property at all has not of itself
lessened the amount awarded.
Where there are joint tortfeasors, the wealth of one or more of them
has also been taken into consideration. 1  Since punitive damages are
assessed against the defendants jointly rather than severally this has led to
injustice to those less able to pay, thereby imposing an unjust burden on
them." Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the comparative wealth of one or more of the joint tortfeasors shall not
be taken into account.5 3 The wealthy defendant, then, pays less by deliber-
ately associating with joint tortfeasors less affluent. If punishment is actually
the basis for punitive damages, why have not the courts imposed exemplary
41. Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
42. Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 At. 640 (1917).
43. Taber v. Huston, 5 Ind. 332, 61 Am. Dec. 96 (1854); Winkler v. Roeder, 23
Neb. 706, 8 Am. St .Rep. 155 (1888).
44. Patterson v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co., 130 La. 797, 34 So. 782(1903).
45. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
46. 2 SUTRLrAND, DAMAGES, 1116 (3d ed. 1903).
47. Borkenstein v. Schrach, 31 Ind. App, 220, 67 N.E. 547 (1903).
48. Taber v. Huston, 5 Ind. 332, 61 Am. Dec. 96 (1854).
49. White v. White, 76 Kan. 82, 90 Pac. 1087 (1907); Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt.
332, 85 At!. 620 (1913).
50. Pelton v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 139 Ore. 198, 7 P.2d 263 (1932).
51. Oskamp v. Oskamp, 20 Ohio App. 349, 152 N.E. 208 (1925).
52. Woodhonse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758 (1925).
53, Washington Gaslight Co. v, Lnsden, 172 U.S, 534 (1898).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
damages severally against each joint tortfeasor based upon his ability to pay?
Provocation
The acts of a plaintiff which provoke the defendant's wrongful act-
since the courts recognize the frailty of human passions 4-can mitigate the
amount of punitive damages defendant has to pay.Y5 The acts or words of
provocation must be reasonably connected with the defendant's acts, how-
ever.56 If enough "cooling time" has elapsed between the provocation and
the wrongful act, punitive damages will not be mitigated. "7 One day was
held to be sufficient cooling timej 6 and under certain circumstances thirty
minutes was sufficient."
Cost of Living
Although the courts say that compensatory damages supposedly make
the plaintiff whole, still, in awarding punitive damages for death actions60
or permanent personal injuries,"' the courts take into consideration the
changes in cost of living and in the purchasing power of money. The
dependents relied on the support of the deceased. Since his wages would
reflect the changes so ought the damages, as the loss suffered, theoretically,
is the sum total of the deceased's earning power. This 'type of reasoning
pinpoints the fact that the distinction between punitive and compensatory
damages may be of slight consequence, 62 or of no consequence whatsoever.
ARE PuNrrTvE DAMAEs NECESSARY?
Some courts, in applying the principle of punitive damages, follow the
rule because of precedent but deplore the fact that it is the rule.63 Others,
admitting there is no logical justification for punitive damages, claim that
whatever the abstract reason is (implying there is no reason, or if there is,
it is beyond common understanding) it must be followed, until the legis-
lature changes it.61
The jurisdictions that do not favor punitive damages argue that a prin-
ciple which permits a plaintiff to be unjustly enriched when he has already
been made whole at the expense of the defendant in the guise of warning
or punishment is unsound, no matter what the public advantages may be,
if any.65
Punitive damages were originally given to cover those injuries, which
were not included in the computation of actual damages, i.e., mental suf-
fering and anguish. What is the purpose of punitive damages today, where
54. Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481, 46 Am. Rep. 342 (1882).55. Bond v. Williams, 279 Mo. 215, 214 S.W. 202 (1919); Royer v. Belcher, 100
W. Va. 694, 131 S.E. 556 (1926).
56. .Webb v. Brown, 63 Fla. 306, 58 So. 27 (1912).
57. Davis v. Collins, 69 SC. 460, 18 S.E. 469 (1904).58. Grovan v. Kulkhuch, 59 Iowa 18, 12 N.A. 748 (1882).
59. Lovelace v. Miller, 150 Ala. 422, 43 So. 734 (1907).
60. O'Meara v. Haiden, 204 Cal. 354, 268 Pac. 334 (1928).
61. McCreedy v. Fournier, 113 Wash, 351, 194 Pac. 398 (1920).62. Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920).
63. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582 (1878).
64. Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 38 Am. Rep. 295 (1880).65. Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 5t (1878).
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these injuries are included in awarding compensatory damages? 6 Why
punish for punishment's sake?
This is especially true when the defendant has already been punished
in a criminal prosecution. Double punishment ought to be allowed only
if it serves a justifiable purpose. If the defendant has already been pun-
ished in a criminal proceeding it is unfair to punish him again in a civil
action. The civil penalty can exceed the maximum criminal penalty imposed
by statute,67 and yet a smaller weight of evidence is required to support
punitive damages, since "the doctrine of reasonable doubt is replaced by a
preponderance of evidence."68 Different rules of evidence apply, and the
privileges69 the defendant can invoke in a criminal trial are not available to
him in a civil action.
In assessing punitive damages, the rules and formulae of damages are
forgotten. The jury has the power to make the law of damages in each
case. The impact of emotion and its attendant results seem to indicate
that the limit of punitive damages is equal to the limit of a jury's emotion.
That, at times, has been limitless. The social and financial position, color,
and sex of the parties can determine the extent of the damages. Since
logical, objective rules of damages are not applied in computing punitive
damages, such damages completely divorced from compensatory damages
should not be allowed.
The proponents of punitive damages claim they are necessary where a
defendant would rather pay relatively small compensatory damages than
discontinue or alleviate his wrongful conduct.70 These proponents ask how,
then, is the aggrieved individual to be protected? The answer lies in equity"
by injunction. If the defendant persists, he can be held in contempt of
court. The court can order either a jail sentence or a fine, which fine goes
to society. The plaintiff is compensated by the law of damages and is put
in the same position as if the injury had not occurred, not in a better posi-
tion. Equity has the flexibility to meet specific situations with specific
remedies, formulated as the circumstances dictate, and need not fall back
upon antiquated doctrines.
The rule of punitive damages is an anachronism. Its use is anachronis-
tic; it is a ghost out of the past. The reason for its being has long since
been dead. Why don't we bury it?
ARTHUR J. FRANZA
66. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.11. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1872).
67. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. -foefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
68. Willis, Measure of Damages, 22 11.4v. L. Rav. 419 (1909)
69. Self-incrimination, refugal to be a witness, etc.
70. Funk v. H. S. Kerbaugh Inc., 222 Pa. 18, 70 At!. 953 (1908) (defendant paid
frequent compensatory damages rather than alter his method of blasting, which would
have cost many times more).
7 1. Ibid.
